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After 1995, growth in productivity in the United States accelerated dramatically. That economy-
wide growth is often attributed to declining prices for information technology (IT) goods, and 
therefore enhanced productivity growth in that sector. In this paper we investigate an alternative 
explanation for these IT price movements and for the apparent acceleration in U.S. productivity: 
gains in the U.S. terms of trade and tariff reductions, especially for IT products. The globalization 
of the IT sector deepened after 1995 thanks to the Information Technology Agreement of the 
WTO, which eliminated tariffs worldwide in hundreds of IT products. We demonstrate that this 
agreement led to magnified reduction in IT prices. Furthermore, we argue that conventionally 
measured import and export prices indexes are unlikely to accurately reflect these prices declines 
and this mismeasurement spills over into productivity calculations. From 1995 through 2006, the 
average growth rates of our alternative price indexes for U.S. imports are 1.5% per year lower than 
the growth rate of official price indexes. It follows that properly measured terms-of-trade gain can 
account for close to 0.2 percentage points per year, which is about 20% of the 1995-2006 apparent 
increase in productivity growth for the U.S. economy. 
 
                                                 
* We are grateful for Mike Harper’s assistance with the analysis of the productivity measurement implications. We 
draw heavily upon Alterman, Diewert and Feenstra (1999), and the authors are indebted to Bill Alterman and Erwin 
Diewert for that earlier study which we apply here to U.S. productivity growth. For helpful comments we thank 
seminar participants at Columbia, Harvard, Oxford, Statistics Canada and the NBER. For financial support Feenstra 
and Slaughter thank the National Science Foundation. Finally, the views expressed in this paper are those of the 
authors, not those of the Bureau of Economic Analysis or of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
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1. Introduction 
 The single best measure of a country’s average standard of living is its productivity: the value 
of output of goods and services a country produces per unit of factor inputs. The more workers 
produce, the more income they receive and the more they can consume. Higher productivity thus 
brings higher standards of living. Understanding the causes and proper measurement of productivity 
growth has long been a central research area in economics. 
 In the United States, since 1995 growth in aggregate labor productivity appears to have 
accelerated markedly. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that from 1973 to 1995, 
output per worker hour in the nonfarm business sector grew on average at just 1.37 percent per year. 
From 1995 through 2010 this rate accelerated to an average of 2.69 percent per year. 1
 A large literature has in recent years analyzed this improvement in U.S. productivity growth. 
The declining prices of information technology (IT) products, which accelerated in the late 1990s, are 
often credited with key direct and indirect roles in the productivity speedup. For example, Jorgenson 
(2001, p. 2) argues that: “The accelerated information technology price decline signals faster 
productivity growth in IT-producing industries. In fact, these industries have been the source of most 
of aggregate productivity growth throughout the 1990s.”
 If sustained, 
this speed-up in U.S. productivity growth will carry dramatic implications for the U.S. economy. At 
the previous generation’s average annual growth rate of 1.37 percent, average U.S. living standards 
were taking 51 years to double. Should the more-recent average annual growth rate of 2.69 percent 
persist, then average U.S. living standards would take just 26 years to double—a generation faster. 
2
                                                 
1 These calculations are based on BLS data series #PRS85006092, as reported at 
 
www.bls.gov. Similar trends are 
evident in the BLS measures of multifactor productivity (MFP) for the private business sector, which we graph in 
Figure 1. In 2004-2008, U.S. productivity growth decelerated again, but in 2009 it resumed growing rapidly. 
2 Similarly, Oliner and Sichel (2000, p. 17) state that, “… we have interpreted the sharp decline in semiconductor 
prices after 1995 as signaling a pickup in that sector’s TFP growth.” Other prominent studies of the U.S. productivity 
acceleration include Baily and Lawrence (2001), Bosworth and Triplett (2000), Gordon (2000, 2003), Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000a,b), Nordhaus (2001, 2005), and Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002). 
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 In this paper, we argue that part of the apparent speed-up in U.S. productivity growth actually 
represented gains in the terms of trade and tariff reductions, especially for IT products. We first 
demonstrate that some of decline in IT prices was actually due to a multilateral tariff reduction under 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Second, we argue that terms of trade improvements were 
under-measured in U.S. import and export price indexes and that tariffs should be included in import 
prices for productivity measurement purposes. These corrections imply that conventionally measured 
U.S. real output growth and productivity growth were overstated in the years after 1995.3
 The starting point for our argument is the observation that on many measures, the global 
engagement of the U.S. IT industry deepened after 1995—precisely the period of accelerated IT price 
declines that have been interpreted as total factor productivity (TFP). Particularly important was the 
Information Technology Agreement, a comprehensive free-trade agreement that to date remains the 
only such agreement during the life of the WTO. Ratified in 1996 by dozens of countries accounting 
for nearly 95 percent of world IT trade, the ITA eliminated all world tariffs on hundreds of IT 
products in four stages from early 1997 through 2000. This timing suggests that the ITA, discussed in 
section 2, played an important role in the post-1995 trend in IT prices. In particular, for IT products 
made in multiple countries, a multilateral tariff reduction will lead to a magnified decline in their 
prices. Using data on the U.S. import prices of IT products, along with U.S. and foreign tariffs, we 
find strong evidence of such magnified price effects. This result is analogous to the magnified impact 
of tariff reductions on trade, as shown by Kei-Mu Yi (2003, 2010). 
  
 Evidence for the second part of our argument appears in Figure 1, which plots three series. 
The terms of trade based on indexes reported by the BLS is calculated as the ratio of the U.S. 
                                                 
3 Related arguments about how substitution from domestic sources of supply to lower-priced imports can result in an 
overstatement of output and productivity growth are made by Houseman (2007) and several of the papers summarized 
in Houseman and Ryder (2010), including Houseman, Kurz, Lengermann and Mandel (2010) and Reinsdorf and 
Yuskavage (2010). That is a different effect from those that we examine in this paper, however.  
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export price index to the non-petroleum (to exclude the outsized role played by fluctuations in oil 
prices) import price index. The Laspeyres terms of trade index is based on Laspeyres indexes that 
we constructed from the price micro-data that BLS collected from importing and exporting firms 
for the period of September 1993 through December 2006. BLS uses a Laspeyres formula for its 
indexes, so our Laspeyres indexes replicate BLS methods using the micro data to which we had 
access for the analysis reported in this paper.4
The index of U.S. terms of trade shows a declining trend up until 1995 in Figure 1. But since 
1995—at precisely the time that productivity growth picked up—U.S. terms of trade reversed and 
began rising, with a string of solid gains from 1995 through 2006. The average annual gain in the 
U.S. non-petroleum terms of trade from 1995 through 2006 was 1.0%, implying a cumulative gain 
nearly as large as the 15% deterioration in terms of trade from the petroleum price shocks in 1973-
74 and 1979-80. The fact that U.S. terms of trade began to improve precisely when productivity 
accelerated suggests a connection between the two.  
 The third series in Figure 1, also from BLS, is U.S. 
multifactor productivity for the non-farm business sector. Its slope steepens in 1996, reflecting the 
fact that U.S. multifactor productivity growth rose from an average of 0.53 percent per year during 
1987-1995 to 1.41 percent per year during 1996-2006. 
What this link might be, however, is not immediately clear from standard theories of trade 
and growth. By definition, direct, first-order effects from price changes are excluded from the 
concept of productivity change. Consistent with this, Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) have recently argued 
that changes in the terms of trade have no impact on productivity when tariffs are zero. When 
tariffs are present but small, then the impact of terms of trade shocks on productivity is 
correspondingly small. In section 3, we will extend the analysis of Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) from a 
                                                 
4 Our Laspeyres terms-of-trade index does not exactly match the one constructed from published BLS indexes because 
we have incomplete data for some industries. But the difference is immaterial. 
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one-sector to a multi-sector model and similarly consider tariff reductions. In our multi-good 
setting, tariff reductions and changes in the terms of trade have a second-order impact on GDP and 
productivity. 
 Yet if the terms of trade are mismeasured, the story is critically different. Unmeasured 
changes in the terms of trade have a first-order impact on conventionally measured productivity 
growth. In particular, if the reduction in import prices is understated then, other things being equal, 
conventionally measured productivity growth will be correspondingly overstated. 
 There are three reasons why the U.S. terms of trade may be mismeasured for purposes of 
identifying U.S. productivity growth. First, as already noted, the BLS import and export price 
indexes use a Laspeyres formula rather than a superlative formula. Second, the BLS import 
indexes—which the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses to deflate imports—measure 
import prices free of tariffs, and imports are likewise valued excluding duties in the calculation of 
GDP. The relevant import prices facing firms do, however, include these trade barriers. And third, 
the BLS import price index does not account for increases in the variety of imports coming from 
new supplying countries. As demonstrated by work including Feenstra (1994), Hummels and 
Klenow (2006), and Broda and Weinstein (2006), the economic impact of expanding varieties is 
large and therefore critical to account for. In section 4 we construct price indexes that correct for 
all three of these errors. 
 In terms of Figure 1, this key part of our overall argument is that the actual improvement in 
U.S. terms of trade was even higher than the improvement implied by the indexes reported by 
BLS. To preview our main results, Figure 2 shows several alternative terms-of-trade indexes based 
on our calculations in this paper. We repeat from Figure 1 the BLS and our computed Laspeyres 
indexes and then show three others: (i) an exact Törnqvist index for the terms of trade; (ii) the 
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Törnqvist index that also incorporates tariffs into the import prices; (iii) the Törnqvist index that 
incorporates both tariffs and import variety.5
 The key message of Figure 2 is that, corrected for these three measurement errors, actual 
U.S. terms of trade were rising much faster that officially reported. The cumulative impact of these 
three adjustments means that the rise to just December 1999 in the Törnqvist index that 
incorporates tariffs and variety was nearly equal to the cumulative rise in the Laspeyres index all 
the way to December 2006 (compare Figures 1 and 2). While the Laspeyres terms of trade 
constructed from BLS export and import price indexes rose about 0.9% per year over 1995-2006, 
the Törnqvist index incorporating tariffs and import variety rose more than twice as fast, at 2.2% 
per year over the same period. The true terms-of-trade gain for the United States since 1995 has 
been much higher than indicated by official price indexes. 
 
 The corrected terms-of-trade indexes in Figure 2 cannot, however, be used to infer the 
amount by which unmeasured terms-of-trade gains have altered reported U.S. productivity growth. 
They are corrected versions of BLS’s aggregate export and import indexes, but BEA’s measures 
of real output growth—which drive the calculations of productivity growth—use detailed industry 
export and import price indexes, primarily the five-digit Enduse indexes produced by BLS, to 
deflate disaggregated measures of exports and imports. To combine the detailed indexes into a 
deflator for GDP, BEA uses weights based on the composition of GDP and it uses a chained 
Fisher formula, not a Laspeyres formula.  
 Accordingly, to estimate the impact of mismeasured terms of trade on reported 
productivity growth, in section 5 we construct complete sets of corrected Enduse export and 
                                                 
5 The first two of these indexes are set equal to the Laspeyres index in September 1993, the beginning of our sample 
period, whereas the variety adjustment (which is annual) begins in 1990. It is noteworthy that most of the variety 
adjustment occurs in the period after 1995, however, just like our other two adjustments. 
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import price indexes at the 5-digit level (or the 3-digit level in a few cases where the 5-digit level 
of detail is not published by BLS). For exports, we construct two sets of detailed indexes, one 
containing Laspeyres indexes that mimic official BLS indexes (as a benchmark), and another 
containing Törnqvist indexes. For non-petroleum imports, we construct four sets of detailed 
indexes: Laspeyres indexes that mimic official BLS indexes; Törnqvist indexes; Törnqvist indexes 
including tariffs; and Törnqvist indexes including tariffs and a correction for net entry of new 
varieties. We then use a chained Fisher index formula to calculate two alternative indexes for 
exports and four alternative indexes for non-petroleum imports. From these indexes, we calculate 
four versions of the deflator for GDP, a benchmark version based on our detailed Laspeyres 
indexes and three alternative versions based on the detailed Törnqvist indexes.6 Also, because the 
government component of GDP is excluded from official measures of productivity, we calculate 
the deflator for a subset of GDP that excludes government, gross value added of private business.7
 Corrections to deflators for GDP and its subsets imply corrections to measures of real 
output growth, which, in turn, imply corrections to measures of productivity growth. By 
comparing productivity growth calculated from our three alternative corrected price indexes with 
that obtained with our reconstructed official BLS indexes, we thus can estimate the portion of 
conventionally reported U.S. productivity growth that was actually due to unmeasured gains in 
terms of trade and declines in tariffs. Our corrected price deflators rise faster than the official 
deflator, and so our corrected real output and productivity growth are lower. Our preferred 
  
                                                 
6 As explained in Diewert (1978), Fisher indexes lack the property of consistency in aggregation in an exact sense, but 
they are approximately consistent in aggregation. This means that Fisher index for GDP is nearly, but not precisely, 
equal to a combination of the Fisher indexes for each of the mid-level aggregates of C, I, G, X and M.  
7 In analyzing TFP for a sector, the conceptually correct measure of output is the sector’s gross sales outside the 
sector, which equal its value added plus its purchases of intermediate inputs from outside the sector. The output 
concept for the private business sector ought therefore to equal its value added plus imported intermediate inputs, and 
imported intermediates ought to be included in inputs. BLS measures the output of private business by its value added 
because including imported intermediates in inputs instead of netting them out of the output was found to have little 
effect on the TFP estimates.(Gullikson and Harper, 1999, p. 50 and fn 29). 
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estimates are that properly measured terms-of-trade gains and tariff reductions account for close to 
0.2 percentage points—about 20%—of the reported 1996-2006 increase in U.S. productivity 
growth. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Information Technology Agreement  
 Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) committed signatory countries to eliminate all tariffs on a wide range of nearly 200 
IT products. These products covered both finished and intermediate goods such as computers and 
networking and peripheral equipment; circuit boards and other passive/active components; 
semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment; software products and media; and 
telecommunications equipment. 
 The original Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products was 
concluded in December 1996 at the first WTO Ministerial in Singapore. This declaration stipulated 
that for the ITA to take effect, signatory countries would have to collectively represent at least 90% of 
world trade in the covered products. The 29 original signatories accounted for only about 83% of 
covered trade. But by April 1997 many more countries had signed on to push the share over 90%, and 
the agreement entered into force in July 1997. Ultimately there were more than 50 ITA signatories 
that accounted for more than 95% of world trade in the covered ITA products. All ITA signatories 
agreed to reduce to zero their tariffs for all covered ITA products in four equal-rate reductions starting 
in 1997 and ending no later than the start of 2000. 8
of signatory countries, it virtually achieved that goal. 
 Some developing countries were granted 
permission to extend rate cuts beyond 2000, but no later than 2005. The overarching goal of the ITA 
was to eliminate world tariffs in a wide range of IT products. Thanks to the number and commitment  
 8 
 The tariff reductions over 1997-2000 experienced by a number of U.S. IT industries are 
shown in Table 1. The ITA tariff cuts are defined at the 8-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) 
system, used to track import commodities. In Table 1, we indicate the percentage of import value 
within each industry that is covered by ITA commodities. For computers, peripherals and 
semiconductors, 100% of imports were included in the ITA tariff cuts. In the smaller industry of 
blank tapes for audio and visual use, 90% of the imports were covered by the ITA, and in the large 
sector of telecommunication equipment, 80% of the import value was covered by the ITA. Table 1 
also includes the information for several other industries where more than 50% of import value was 
covered by the ITA, and industries such as business machines and equipment, and measuring, testing, 
and control instruments, where less than 50% of the import value was affected by the ITA 
agreement.9 
 In Table 1 we also show the average tariffs at the beginning of 1997, before the ITA was 
implemented, and in 2000, when it was concluded. Clearly, U.S. tariffs in these industries even before 
the ITA agreement were low: average tariffs were between 1 and 4% in all industries, and zero or 
nearly so in computer accessories and semiconductors. This means that the ITA tariff cuts for the 
United States were correspondingly small. But remember that the ITA was a multilateral agreement, 
so that tariff cuts in the U.S. could be matched by equal or larger tariff cuts abroad. For firms 
sourcing their IT products from overseas locations, the tariffs cuts within the ITA could therefore 
have had a multiplied impact on lowering their import prices and costs. Yi (2003, 2010) formally 
models how trade-barrier reductions can trigger magnified responses in trade volumes in the presence 
of cross-border production networks like those so central to IT. We investigate the analogous effect 
                                                                                                                                                                
8 The four tariff cuts for the U.S. occurred in July 1997, January 1998, January 1999, and for a small number of 
commodities, January 2000.  
9 Omitted from Table 1 are industries where less than 10% of imports are covered by the ITA. 
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for import prices in the following section, and indeed, we find that the estimated effect of the ITA 
agreement on U.S. import prices is much larger than that of the direct decrease in tariffs.   
Impact of the ITA on Import Prices 
 To determine how the tariffs cuts under the ITA affected import prices, we construct a 
geometric index for tariffs in industry i, denoted by t,1tiTar
− , as: 


























Tar ,      
where tijτ  denotes the ad valorem U.S. tariff rate for product i coming from country j in month t, 
and tmijw  denotes the share of import expenditure for good i on country j. In practice we use 
annual data for imports so that tmijw  differs by year rather than by month. In addition, we  
construct a geometric index of exchange rates in Enduse industry i, t,1tiExch
− , as a weighted 
average of the exchange rate times the producer price indexes (PPI) for U.S. trading partners. 




− , whose construction mimics that used by the BLS (as discussed in section 4) except that the 
import price indexes are tariff-inclusive. 






iTar  and 
t,0
iExch . We use them in the following pass-through regression: 
  0,tmiLln P =
3 6
t 0,t 0,t t
i0 k k i iti i
k 1 0
lnTar ln Exch Z−
= =
α + α δ + β + β + γ + ε∑ ∑ ll
l
,   
where: αi0 is a fixed-effect for each industry, tkδ  are three indicator variables for the stages of the  
ITA (i.e. July 1997, January 1998 and January 1999) and tiZ  denotes additional control variables. 
The prices of competing products belong in regressions of this type, so our first control variable is 
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the U.S. export price index for industry i, 0,txiLP . In addition, Bergin and Feenstra (2007) have 
recently shown that the share of imports coming from countries with fixed exchange rates, and its 
interaction with the exchange rate, add explanatory power to pass-through regressions for the U.S., 
so we include those as control variables too.  
 Finally, we add controls for the impact of multistage international production on U.S. 
import prices. Yi (2003, 2010) demonstrates the importance of international vertical production 
linkages for explaining why observed international trade flows are substantially larger than what 
standard theory would predict. Here we extend his reasoning to apply to trade prices; goods 
crossing borders multiple times at sequential stages of production will amplify the impact of a 
multilateral liberalization by reducing the cost of imported intermediate inputs for downstream 
firms. This result is shown from equations (5) and (6) in Yi (2010). In a two-stage production 
process where intermediates are exported and final goods imported, the pass-through of a 
symmetric iceberg trade cost, (1+τ), to import prices is (1+θ)(1+τ) log points, where θ indexes the 
share of imported intermediates in final good production. If a third stage is present, the pass-
through multiplier for trade costs rises to (1+θ+θ2). Therefore, as the number of stages grows 
large, the pass-through multiplier for vertical integration approaches 1/(1-θ).10
 To capture these ideas in our pass-through regression, we first include foreign tariffs in the  
  
same industry within the pass-through regression.11
Table 2, which uses 
 The results are shown in columns (1)–(3) of  
t,0
iTar as the U.S. tariff and a weighted average of foreign tariffs. The first  
regression in is run over those industries where 100% of the import commodities are covered by  
                                                 
10 Incidentally, this multiplier looks similar to the border effect in the two-stage model of (1+θ)/(1-θ) derived by Yi 
(2010), but arises for a different reason. 
11 We use the MFN ad-valorem applied tariff rates for U.S. trading partners from TRAINS, aggregated annually from 
the 6-digit HS schedule to 5-digit Enduse industries and across U.S. trade partners. For the ITA industries, the tariffs 
available on the WTO webpage were more accurate and were used in place of the TRAINS tariffs. 
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the ITA (denoted by ITA = 1); from Table 1, these industries are computers, peripherals and 
semiconductors. The second regression is run over those industries where 1 – 99% of the import 
value covered by the ITA (0 < ITA < 1), and the third regression is run over a control group of 
industries that include no ITA commodities (ITA=0).12
 Looking first at the regression for ITA = 1, the indicator variables for the ITA tariff cuts 
(July 1997, January 1998 and January 1999) are all negative, indicating a drop in prices that is not 
accounted for by the tariff variable. The cumulative drop due to the indicator variables is nearly 
20%. The tariff variable itself has a “pass-through” coefficient of 13.3, which is extremely large 
compared to what is normally found and indicates that the tariff declines have a highly magnified 
effect on lowering the import prices.
 
13
 Column (2) of Table 2 reports the pass-through regression run over industries with 
intermediate levels of import value covered by ITA products (i.e., 0 < ITA < 1). This regression 
indicates a U.S. tariff pass-through coefficient of 2.4, and 0.32 for the foreign tariff. These 
estimates are still larger than, though more in line with, Yi’s two-stage model (i.e. coefficients of 1 
on the U.S. tariff and θ on the foreign tariff again). Column (3) reports the pass-through regression 
for a control group of primarily capital and consumer goods industries that do not include any 
commodities affected by the ITA tariff cuts. For these industries, we find a U.S. tariff coefficient 
 The foreign tariff has a coefficient of 4.15, which is also 
very large. Our expectation from the two-stage production model of Yi, discussed above, is that 
the total pass-through of a symmetric tariff cut of one percentage point would be (1+θ) percentage 
points, which we can separate as coefficients of 1 on the U.S. tariff and θ on the foreign tariff. 
Obviously, our results in column (1) indicate a much larger impact of the ITA tariff cuts. 
                                                 
12 The control group of industries used in the final regressions includes capital goods (Enduse 2), automobiles and 
parts (Enduse 3), consumer goods (Enduse 4) and chemicals (Enduse 12). 
13 In the absence of the foreign country control variable, the coefficient on the tariff variable is 19.4. 
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of 0.99, which is insignificantly different from unity, while the foreign tariff is not significant at 
all.14
 One reason that the pass-through coefficients for the ITA=1 industries are so high may be 
that these goods are subject to more stages of international production than two: components 
might cross borders multiple times. If so, a 1 percent symmetric tariff cut would have a cumulative 
impact on the price of 1/(1–θ) percent, where θ is the share of imported intermediate inputs. The 
coefficient θ applies to the foreign country in Yi’s model, but the variable available to us is the 
share of imported intermediate inputs for the U.S. described in Feenstra and Hanson (1999). 
Recognizing that a θ computed with U.S. data is not necessarily applicable to foreign countries, 
we do an analogous calculation of θ using the 2000 Chinese input-output table, which 
distinguishes ordinary and processing imports to China. Our preferred specification, reported in 
columns (4)–(6), uses a weighted average of the Chinese and U.S. values of θ (using the U.S. 
import shares of ordinary and processed Chinese goods, and non-Chinese goods, by industry), and 
multiplies both the U.S. tariff and the foreign tariff by 1/(1–θ) in each Enduse industry.  
  
 The results for the ITA=1 industries in column (4) show that the pass-though coefficient of 
U.S. tariffs comes down to 1.5, while the coefficient on the foreign tariff is 0.7 (both these tariffs 
are multiplied by 1/(1–θ)). These are much more reasonable values for pass-through coefficients, 
with the coefficient on the U.S. tariff insignificantly different from unity. For the other ITA 
industries in column (5), we find a pass-though of the U.S. tariff of almost exactly unity, and a 
very small effect for the foreign tariff.  Finally, for the control group of industries in column (6), 
                                                 
14 We have also estimated the price regression for subsets of the control group. For automobiles and parts (Enduse 3), 
and for consumer goods (Enduse 4), the linear combination of the tariff coefficient and partner tariff coefficient is 
insignificantly different from unity. For capital goods, that linear combination is insignificantly different from 1.5; this 
pass-through would be exactly the prediction of the Yi model with θ =0.5.  The only Enduse category outside the ITA 
industries that shows consistently higher tariff and partner tariff coefficients is Enduse 12500, which is chemicals. 
However, not including chemicals in the control group has only slight effects on the tariff coefficient. 
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the pass-through from the U.S. tariff is 0.72, which is somewhat lower than expected but not that 
unusual and, again, we find very small foreign tariff effects.  
 Thus, by controlling for many stages of production using 1/(1–θ) we obtain very 
reasonable estimates for the ITA=1 industries, without affecting the other industries too much.  
These findings support our hypothesis that the multi-stage nature of production in high-tech 
industries is responsible for the magnified impact of the tariff cuts in reducing import prices.  
Despite the fact that U.S. tariffs were low, the global nature of the ITA resulted in significant 
reductions in U.S. high-tech prices.  This result is shown in last column of Table 1, where we have 
computed the implied change in U.S. import prices for high-tech products due to the ITA.  We do 
so by comparing actual import prices with an estimate of counterfactual prices had the ITA not 
occurred, what we call a “non-ITA” price index.  This latter series is constructed using the pass-
through coefficients in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 and by holding the tariff-related variables 
constant at their pre-ITA levels.15  The resulting predicted values are our best estimate of the 
counterfactual import prices that would have existed had the ITA not been implemented.16
 
  The 
last column of Table 1 reports the percentage difference at the end of our sample period between 
the published import prices and our calculated hypothetical non-ITA import prices. Tariffs played 
a key role in lowering U.S. import prices for high-tech goods:  the ITA contributed 16 and 24 
percent, respectively, to the decline in computer and computer accessory prices, and large amounts 
to several other Enduse industries.  
3. Measurement of Productivity Growth with International Trade 
                                                 
15 To facilitate comparison with the BLS published series, we set the non-ITA series equal to the BLS import prices up 
until June 1997 and use the predicted values of the pass-through regression to extend the index thereafter.  
16 An alternative formulation of this counterfactual would use columns (4) and (5) instead of columns (1) and (2).  
However, the difference between those two series turns out to be small and does not materially affect our results. 
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We have seen in the previous section that tariffs on imported IT products fell during the 
period covered by the ITA. In this section we describe how to account for such declines in tariffs 
in the measurement of total factor productivity (TFP) at an economy-wide level, and we consider 
additional sources of mismeasurement of TFP arising from the deflators for exports and imports. 
In our exposition of the theory, we assume that productivity is measured for GDP as a whole even 
though, in practice, the available information only permits the private business portion of GDP to 
be included in the broad measure of productivity growth.  
Our theoretical model extends the model of international trade and productivity of Diewert 
and Morrison (1986), which treats imports as intermediate inputs into the economy’s GDP 
function. To outline the notation, suppose there are i = 1,…,M final goods, with quantities tiq > 0 
and prices tip > 0. In addition, there are i = 1,…,N exported outputs, with quantities 
t
ix  > 0 and 
international prices txip > 0. For simplicity, we ignore taxes or subsidies on exports. Finally, there 
are also i = 1,…,N imported intermediate inputs, but each of these come in j = 1,…,C varieties 
indexed by the country of origin. So the import quantities are tijm  > 0, with international prices 
t
mijp > 0, ad valorem tariffs 
t




mij τ+ .  
The vector of final goods and free-trade prices is denoted by Pt = (pt, txp ,
t
mp ), and the  
quantities of these goods are yt = (qt, x
t, mt) > 0. Further, the import tariffs are in the vector τ t.  
Then the revenue function for the economy is:  




































t  (1) 
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where St(vt) is a convex technology set that depends on the country’s endowment of primary 
factors vt. We assume that St(vt) is strictly convex, so the maximum in (1) is well-defined. The 
superscript t on the revenue function indicates that the technology can change over time.  
The revenue function equals the total value added of all industries with tariffs included in 
intermediate input costs, which is the “production approach” measure of the economy’s output.17
In contrast, tariffs are excluded from the cost of imports in the definition of GDP because the  
  







t xpX  denote the value of 









t mpM  denote the value of imports at duty-free prices. Using  
the expenditure approach, nominal GDP is measured by: 








t – Mt) . (2) 
Substituting for Xt and Mt, we can re-write nominal GDP as the function: 












mij mp ,  (3) 
where the equality is obtained using the definition of the revenue function Rt(Pt, τt, vt). Equation 
(3) states that nominal GDP equals the aggregate output Rt(Pt, τt, vt) plus tariff revenue.  
 To analyze the effect of tariff changes on the measure of nominal GDP, we use the GDP  
function in (3) to obtain the familiar optimality of free trade in a small open economy:  
Proposition 1 
Holding fixed Pt and vt, the value of GDP in (3) is maximized at τt = 0. 
                                                 
17 Assuming that tariffs are the only tax on products, Rt(Pt+Tt, vt) is the measure of aggregate output known as “gross 
value added at basic prices” in the international guidelines for national accounts in the System of National Accounts 
or SNA and equation (3) is the production approach measure of GDP (United Nations et al., 1993, paragraphs 6.235 
and 6.237.) Following the SNA, we refer to Rt(Pt+Tt, vt) as the economy’s total valued added. In contrast, BEA 
defines total gross value-added to include tariffs and other taxes on products, making it the same as GDP.  
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mijmp− , it follows 
that the first derivative of the GDP function with respect to tijτ  is zero evaluated at 0
t
ij =τ . The 
second derivative is negative semi-definite because the revenue function is concave in import 
prices. It follows that τt = 0 is a maximum. QED 
 
This familiar result shows the optimality of zero tariffs in a small country, and has a very 
important implication for the measurement of productivity. Diewert (2006, p. 301), citing 
Jorgenson and Griliches (1972), observes that tariffs and similar taxes on intermediate inputs 
(such as excise taxes) should be included in input prices when measuring productivity change. The 
revenue function allows us to do this because it uses tariff-inclusive prices. We will show that 
even if “true” productivity change is zero, then total factor productivity as it is commonly 
measured will be positive when tariffs are reduced.  
To show this result, we begin by defining “true” productivity. A very general formulation 
of productivity change, due originally to Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) and applied to an 
open economy setting by Diewert and Morrison (1986), Kohli (1990, 2004, 2005, 2006) and 
Diewert (2008), comes from defining productivity as the shift in the economy’s revenue function 
while holding prices and factor endowments fixed. Depending on which period’s prices and 

















≡ − . (4) 
 These concepts of productivity change are not measurable because both the numerator of 
At-1 and the denominator of At are unobservable. Yet their geometric mean can be measured, once 
we assume a specific form for the revenue function. In particular, suppose that the revenue 
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function takes a nested form. In the first stage, for imported varieties }C,...,1{Jj i ⊆∈ , we 
suppose that the revenue function in (1) is a CES function with elasticity σi,  










 + τ  ∑ , i=1,…,N. (5) 
In the next section we will show how the import prices can be aggregated over supplying 
countries, obtaining tmip~ , but for now suppose that these aggregate import prices are available, and 
denote the vector of prices by )p~,p,p(P~ tm
t
x
tt ≡ . Then in the second stage, across goods and 
factors, we suppose that revenue is a translog function over the prices tP~  and endowments. We 
further assume that the parameters multiplying these prices in the translog revenue function are 
stable over time, but the coefficients multiplying endowments are allowed to change over time, 
reflecting technological change. It follows from Diewert and Morrison (1986) that: 









R / [PT( 1tP
~ − , tP~ ,yt-1,yt) QT(v
t-1,vt,wt-1,wt)] , (6) 
where PT( 1tP
~ − , tP~ ,yt-1,yt) is a Törnqvist price index over final goods, exports and imports, and 
QT(w
t-1,wt,vt-1,vt) is a Törnqvist quantity index over primary factors, with prices wt-1 and wt. 
 Equation (6) states that productivity growth can be measured by deflating the change in 
nominal revenue Rt by its price deflator PT, then comparing the estimate of real revenue growth  
to the growth in primary factors QT. The Törnqvist price index appearing in (6) is defined as: 
ln PT( 1tP


















































































































































1j . (7) 
Note that the weights used to sum over domestic goods, exports and imports in (7) add up to unity, 
and that imports receive a negative weight because they are inputs.  
We can now compare “true” productivity growth in (6) to what is typically measured. The 
treatment of tariffs in conventional estimates of aggregate TFP differs from their treatment in (5) 
because nominal output is measured by GDPt, not Rt, and because import prices are measured 
without tariffs in the index used to deflate imports. That is, conventional estimates of aggregate 











G / [PE(Pt-1,Pt,yt-1,yt) QE(wt-1,wt,vt-1,vt)], (8) 
where Gt ≡ Gt(Pt, τt, vt) is nominal GDP, PE(P
t-1,Pt,yt-1,yt) is an exact GDP deflator over prices of 
final domestic demand, exports, and duty-free imports, and QE(w
t-1,wt,vt-1,vt) is an exact quantity 
index of primary factors. If the functional form for these indexes is exact for the underlying 
revenue function (as is the case for the Törnqvist index, which is exact for the translog revenue 
function), and if tariffs are zero, then conventionally measured TFP in (8) is identical to “true” 
productivity growth in (6). However, measured TFP will differ from “true” productivity when 
tariffs are non-zero or when the price indexes used in (8) are not exact for the underlying revenue 
function, as is the case for the U.S. In particular, the GDP price deflator PE(P
t-1,Pt,yt-1,yt) 
appearing in (8) is constructed by the BEA as a Fisher Ideal index using components of the CPI, 
PPI and export and import price indexes obtained from BLS. The export and import component 
indexes are Laspeyres indexes and are duty-free. 
 19 
To understand the impact of tariffs on the difference between “true” and measured TFP, 
notice that “true” productivity in (6) has tariffs appearing in both the numerator (as arguments of 
the revenue function) and the denominator (the Törnqvist price index is tariff-inclusive). In 
contrast, measured TFP in (8) excludes tariffs from both the numerator (think of GDP as 
C+I+G+X–M, with imports measured at duty-free prices) and the denominator (since the prices 
in the import indexes from BLS are duty-free). Yet even though the construction of conventional 
TFP in (8) is consistent in its treatment of tariffs, it is affected by tariffs because the quantities of 
outputs and inputs are chosen at tariff-distorted prices in (8) and hence respond to changes in 
tariffs. The impact of these quantity responses is shown by the following result: 
 
Proposition 2 
Assume that technology, prices and endowments do not change between periods, so that St-1 = S
t, 
Pt-1 = P
t, and vt-1 = v
t. Then reducing tariffs from τt-1 ≠ 0 to τt = 0 will lead to TFPt > 1 in (8),  
even though 1)AA( 2/1t1t =−  in (6), indicating that there is no “true” productivity change. 
Proof: The assumption that St-1 = S
t implies 1)AA( 2/1t1t =−  in (6). Further assuming that Pt-1 = 
Pt and vt-1 = v
t means that PE = QE = 1. From these assumptions we have G
t-1(Pt-1, τt-1, vt-1) = 
Gt(Pt, τt-1, vt), which is not being maximized because τt-1 ≠ 0. From Proposition 1, reducing tariffs 
to zero raises GDP, so Gt(Pt, 0, vt) > Gt(Pt, τt-1, vt) and TFPt > 1 in (8). QED 
 
 Proposition 2 states that the efficiency gain from eliminating tariffs — which is a 
movement around the production possibilities frontier — will incorrectly be attributed to TFP 
growth as measured by (8). But, in addition to changes in tariffs, the level of tariffs can also 
interact with changes in prices to cause mismeasurement of productivity change. In particular, in 
the presence of tariffs, quantity responses to changes in the terms of trade can result efficiency 




Assume that technology and endowments do not change, so that At-1 = A
t in (4). Then τt-1 ≠ 0 or τt 
≠ 0 is a necessary condition for a change in prices to result in TFPt ≠ 1 in (8).  
 
The proof is immediate, since when τt-1 = τt = 0, then measured TFP in (8) is identical to “true” 
productivity in (6), which is unity regardless of any change in price. Thus, a change in the terms of 
trade has an impact on measured TFP only if tariffs are non-zero.  
The effects of tariffs on the measurement of productivity arise because the output concept 
that is measured by GDP uses tariff-free prices, while the output concept that is best-suited for 
measuring productivity change uses tariff-inclusive prices. For the United States and other 
industrial countries, tariffs and changes in tariffs — such as occurred under the ITA — are low. 
Thus, if the treatment of tariffs were the only problem in the measurement of productivity, we 
would expect the impact of the ITA on measured TFP to be small.  
Yet when the price index PE(P
t-1,Pt,yt-1,yt) is mismeasured, additional measurement errors 
in TFP arise besides the omission of tariffs, and these need not be small. In particular, unmeasured 
changes in the terms of trade have a first-order impact on conventionally measured productivity 
growth. The U.S. import and export price indexes are subject to two sources of measurement error. 
First, as already noted, the industry-level BLS import and export prices indexes are Laspeyres 
indexes, so they are vulnerable to substitution bias. And second, the BLS import price index does 
not account for increases in the variety of imports coming from new supplying countries. Provided 
that the new countries are supplying differentiated products, the resulting fall in the CES indexes 
of import prices leads to a mismeasurement of TFP that is first-order.18
                                                 
18 These first-order gains from import variety, as measured by Broda and Weinstein (2006), arise in the model of 
Krugman (1980) where an increase in import variety does not lead to any reduction in domestic variety. But in the 
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The BEA uses a Fisher formula to aggregate detailed indexes from BLS to obtain the GDP 
deflator in (8). The difference between the Fisher and the Törnqvist formulas is negligible, so for 
convenience we will write the GDP deflator as the Törnqvist formula over the domestic prices and 
Laspeyres export and import indexes. Denoting the Laspeyres export and import indexes from 
BLS by t,1txiLP
−  and t,1tmiLP
− , the deflator for GDP is:  


























































































































1j .    (9) 
For convenience, we also suppose that a Törnqvist formula is used for QE(w
t-1,wt,vt-1,vt) in (8),  
which is the quantity index of primary factors, just as in (6).  
Comparing (6)-(7) with (8)-(9), the difference between measured and “true” TFP growth is: 










































































































































































































+ ==∑  .    (10) 
                                                                                                                                                                
Melitz (2003) model, Feenstra (2010) shows that the welfare gain from the increase in import variety exactly cancels 
with the welfare loss from the reduction in domestic variety. There is, however, still a first-order welfare gain from the 
improved selection of more productive firms into exporting. 
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  To interpret the first line of (10), notice that Gt and Rt differ only by tariff revenue, as in 
(3). For the U.S. economy as a whole, tariff revenue relative to GDP is very small, and so is the 
difference between Gt and Rt, so the term on the first line of (10) is small. The term on the second 
line of (10) depends on the difference between the “true” index of export prices )p/p( 1txi
t
xi
−  and 
the Laspeyres index of export prices. If the Laspeyres index overstates the true index, as we shall 
find, that tends to make measured TFP less than the “true” productivity index. The reverse occurs 
on the import side, where upward bias in the Laspeyres price index t,1tmiLP
− as compared to the “true” 
price index )p~/p~( 1tmi
t
mi
− leads to an upward bias in measured TFP. We find in the following 
sections that the differences between the “true” import price index )p~/p~( 1tmi
t
mi
−  and the Laspeyres 
index can be substantial, especially for IT products, while the differences on the export side are 
not as large; as a result, the combined effect is an upward bias in the measurement of TFP.  
 
4. Measurement of International Prices 
 The International Price Program (IPP) of the BLS uses monthly prices for imports and 
exports collected from firms to construct import and export prices indexes by means of a 
Laspeyres formula. We have the detailed monthly prices for September 1993 –December 2006, 
together with an (incomplete) set of the value weights used in the BLS indexes, as discussed in the 
Appendix. From these data we replicate the construction of BLS’s Laspeyres indexes, and then 
improve on these methods by constructing various Törnqvist price indexes.  
 Suppose that within Enduse industry i and month t, a set tiJ  of price quotes is available. In 
the previous section we used tiJ  to denote countries exporting good i to the U.S., but more 
generally this set denotes all available prices by country, firm, and item-level products within the 
industry i. The Laspeyres import price index constructed by BLS is then: 
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∑ ,     (11) 
where tmip  is the duty-free price of import i in month t; 
0
mip is the price of item i in a base year 0, 
and 0miw  is the annual import share is a base year 0, with 1wi
0
mi =∑ . Since (11) refers to the  
cumulative price increase from the base period 0 to month t, the month-to-month price change is 
obtained as the ratio of such long-term indexes: 





−− ≡ ,      (12) 
Analogous formulas apply on the export side. 
Consider now the true import prices tmip~ . In the previous section we assumed that the 
revenue function was CES across the set of countries selling each good i. In that case, the import 
prices tmip~  should be obtained using an index formula that is exact for the CES function. To 
develop that index, suppose first that the set of countries j selling good i does not change, and 
denote that set by iJj∈ . Then the ratio of CES price aggregates can be expressed as: 






























− ∏     (13)  
where t,1tmiGP
−  is the “geometric” index due to Sato (1977) and Vartia (1977), and uses the weights  
t
mijw  which are the logarithmic mean of the import shares in periods t-1 and t, for good i and 

































































≡ .  (14)  
That is, the Sato-Vartia index is a geometric mean over the import price ratios, computed over the 
countries that are supplying the import good in both periods.  
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 As new supplying countries may sell good i or other supplying countries may exit, we need 
to extend the Sato-Vartia formula to account for effects of new and disappearing countries. A 
formula to do this is derived in Feenstra (1994) for the CES model with i > 1. Suppose that the 
set of countries supplying product i in period t, tiJj∈ , has a non-empty intersection with a base 
period 0 set, 0iJ . We denote this intersection by 
0 t
i i iJ J J≡ ∩ ≠∅. Then define the term 
t
miλ  as the 
value of imports in period t from countries also supplying product i in period 0, relative to the total 
imports of product i in period t:  




















∈ .      (15) 
The term tmiλ   1 can be interpreted as the period t expenditure on the goods in the set Ji relative 
to total import expenditure on good i. Alternatively, tmiλ  can be interpreted as one minus the share 
of period t expenditure on “new” selling countries (not in the set Ji). The greater the market share 
of the new selling countries in period t, the lower the value of tmiλ . The corresponding term for 
period t-1, 1tmi
−λ , equals period t-1 expenditure on the goods in Ji relative to the total expenditure, or 
one minus the share of expenditure on new countries. Then the ratio of CES price aggregates that 
includes the effect of net entry of new supplying countries can be expressed as: 






























λ ,     (16) 
where t,1tmiGP
−  is again the Sato-Vartia geometric index. As new supplying countries sell more, the 
effective price in (16) falls by an amount that depends on σi.  
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 In applying equations (13) – (16) to the BLS price data, several issues arise. First, a true 
monthly Sato-Vartia price index t,1tmiGP
−  would require the use of monthly trade weights for imports. 
In practice the monthly trade weights are too volatile to be reliable, so we have instead used 
annual trade weights combined with monthly data on the import and export prices, to construct 
geometric indexes. The formula for the import index t,1tmiGP
− is still given by (13)-(14), but now 
t
mijw  reflects the annual import shares for Enduse industry i, which do not vary across months. 
The geometric indexes constructed in this way could equally well be called Törnqvist indexes — 




−  and the weights tmijw  in (14).
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Second, the import values used to construct the λ-values in (15) are also annual, and are 
taken from Harmonized System (HS) trade data. To apply these annual HS data to equations (15) 
and (20), let h denote a 10-digit HS good and 
  
t
hJ  denote the set of countries exporting that good to 
the U.S. in any month within the year. Then 0 th h hJ J J≡ ∩  is the intersection of that set over year t 






construct the λ-ratios in two steps: (a) we use (15) to construct  for each HS product h, 
and raise these to the power 1/(σh – 1) to reflect the elasticity of substitution between varieties 
(from Broda and Weinstein, 2006); (ii) then we take the geometric mean across products iHh∈   
within an Enduse industry i:  















−∏ λλ≡Λ .   (17) 
                                                 
19 Normally the Törnqvist index uses the simple averages 2/)ss( tmij
1t
mij +
−  for weights, but 1tmijs
− = tmijs  when using 
annual data. Then letting tmij
1t
mij ss →
−  in (20), we have tmij
t
mij sw → , as can be shown using L’Hopitals rule. 
20 That is, for HS system codes that exist in 1989 we use that year as the base for constructing product variety. There 
was a major revision to the HS system in 1996, so for codes introduced between 1990 and 1996, we use the first year 
the code appeared as the base for constructing product variety. HS codes introduced after 1996 are not used. 
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Note that (17) is an inverse measure of import variety, because having new supplying countries 
will lead to a lower value in (17). Finally, in (16) the Törnqvist index t,1tmiGP
−  is multiplied by tmiΛ  
to obtain the price index corrected for variety. 
Third, it is important to recognize that the measure of product variety we obtain is not   
invariant to the choice of base year, which we have assumed is the first year that an HS code  
appears between 1989 and 1996. That choice will ensure that all countries who first supply in an 
HS category after 1989 will be included in the term tmhλ  every year, and are therefore being 
treated as having entirely new products every year. As explained by Feenstra (1994, Prop. 1), 
these countries can have shifting taste parameters – or shifting quality – for their products every 
year, and our construction of the CES index is still exact. Allowing for shifting quality in this way 
is especially important for IT products. In contrast, the countries who are already supplying in an 
HS category in the first year it appears are assumed to have constant taste parameters and quality. 
By choosing an early base year we are therefore allowing for the most countries to have changing 
quality for their products, which was also the approach taken by Broda and Weinstein (2006).21
Having obtained the import price indexes for each 5-digit Enduse industry, we do the same  
 




 We denote the Törnqvist export price 
indexes by , which are used in place of )p/p( 1txi
t
xi
−  in (10). The import and export price 
indexes are constructed for all 5-digit Enduse industries from September 1993 – December 2006. 
In Figures 1 and 2 we displayed the terms of trade constructed from the Laspeyres and Törnqvist 
                                                 
21 Broda and Weinstein used 1972 as the base year for the Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (TSUSA) system, and 1990 for 
the Harmonized system, while omitting 1989 due to the unification of Germany in that year. 
22 Feenstra and Kee (2008) and Feenstra (2010) argue that new export varieties should be modeled as having a rise in 
their price from a low price, where supply is zero, to a higher price. Therefore, adjusting export prices for increased 
variety leads to an increase in the effective export price index and an increase in the implied terms of trade. However, 
this result assumes that the entry of new export varieties is driven by shifts in foreign demand, not domestic 
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indexes for aggregate export and import price indexes. In Figure 3–10 we show the import and 
export indexes for the various IT industries, normalized to 100 in September 1993 (except for 
computers, which begins in 1994). 
 In Figure 3 we show the BLS, Laspeyres, non-ITA Laspeyres (as defined in Section 2), 
and Törnqvist indexes (with adjustments for tariffs and variety) for imports of Computers, Enduse 
21300. Our Laspeyres index differs only slightly from the published BLS price index, due to 
missing data and concordances that are not fully accurate, but the differences seem small enough 
to proceed.  The non-ITA series, which projects a path for import prices holding tariff variables 
constant after June 1997, lies well above the published series; this gap demonstrates the 
importance the ITA played in lowering high-tech prices relative to the hypothetical world with no 
ITA. The tariff-inclusive Törnqvist index is about 7 percentage points below the Laspeyres by the 
end of the sample, though since actual tariff declines were small, the vast majority of the 
difference is accounted for by the alternative index formula. The impact of variety is to reduce the 
price index by a modest 1% through 2006. On the export side, in Figure 4 the BLS index, 
Laspeyres and Törnqvist are all very close, deviating only slightly over the sample period.  
 The greater upward bias of the Laspeyres index in the case of imports can be explained by 
the difference between the way that substitution behavior affects the import index and the way that 
it affects the export index. For imports, cost-minimizing behavior by U.S. buyers tends to raise the 
relative quantities of the items with the smallest price indexes, causing the superlative Törnqvist 
index to be below the Laspeyres index. For exports, revenue-maximizing behavior of U.S. 
producers responding to shocks in foreign demand tends to raise the relative quantities of the items 
                                                                                                                                                                
productivity gains. Because domestic productivity gains are clearly an important driver of new export varieties, we do 
not pursue the adjustment for export varieties here. 
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with the largest price increases, raising the relative position of the Törnqvist index.23
 In Figure 5 we show the import price indexes for Computer Accessories (Enduse 21301). 
In this case, the non-ITA Laspeyres index lies 24 percentage points above the Laspeyres by the 
end of the sample, while the tariff-inclusive Törnqvist index is about 9 percentage points below 
the Laspeyres. Further adjustment for variety is small, so that the Törnqvist index inclusive of 
tariffs and variety is 11 percentage points below the Laspeyres by December 2006. For exports in 
Figure 6, the Törnqvist index has a relatively large drop in June 1998, which appears much more 
muted in the BLS index and the Laspeyres because those indexes are using base-period weights 
rather and current weights, and use an arithmetic mean formula (11) rather than the geometric 
mean (19).  
 Indeed, if 
shocks to foreign demand and falling foreign tariffs were the only drivers of changes in the 
composition of U.S. exports, we could expect to find the Laspeyres export index to be below its 
Törnqvist counterpart, but the presence of other factors, including shocks to domestic supply, 
means that producer substitution behavior just makes the difference between the Laspeyres index 
and the Törnqvist index smaller without reversing its sign. 
 Turning to Semiconductors (Enduse 3120) in Figures 7 and 8, for imports we again see 
that the tariff-inclusive Törnqvist index is about 13 percentage points below the Laspeyres by the 
end of the period. Though the effects of the ITA are more modest than for computers, the impact 
of variety is significant, reducing the price index by 5 percentage points over the course of the 
sample. For exports, we see that the Törnqvist index lies substantially below the Laspeyres index. 
In this case, it appears that the conventional demand-side upward bias of the Laspeyres index 
dominates, as buyers of U.S. exports substitute away from goods whose relative prices have gone 
                                                 
23 Varian (1984) presents the theory of the reverse direction of substitution bias in a producer’s index from the more 
familiar substitution bias of a consumer’s index, which is covered in Varian (1982). 
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up. This demand-side substitution on exports did not occurs for Computers, where the Törnqvist 
export price index did not differ much from the Laspeyres. In general equilibrium, there can be 
either demand-side or supply-side substitution in the price and quantities, and so we should not be 
surprised that the Laspeyres bias in export price indexes can go in either direction; for the import 
price indexes, however, we generally find the upward bias expected for consumers. 
 Finally, in Figures 9 and 10 we show the indexes for Telecommunications (Enduse 21400). 
In this case the non-ITA prices were only slightly higher than the Laspeyres and the tariff-
inclusive Törnqvist fell by 9 percentage points more, owing in part to a significant fall in tariffs 
over 1996-1999. The variety adjustment is especially substantial, leading to a reduction in the 
Törnqvist index by a factor of 0.93 in 1999 and accelerating to 0.67 in 2006. On the export side, 
we see that the Törnqvist index is below the Laspeyres, which is the same pattern that occurred in 
Semiconductors and in the later periods for Computer Accessories.  
 To summarize the results from these four IT industries, in every case the Törnqvist index 
for imports is considerably below the Laspeyres by the end of the sample period, whereas for 
exports the indexes differed significantly in only two cases. That means the impact of the 
mismeasurement of import prices will have a greater impact on TFP – leading to an upward bias – 
than the mismeasurement of export prices. The contribution of the ITA to falling import prices is 
clear from these four industries as well. Absent the U.S. and global tariff cuts under the ITA, U.S. 
import prices would have fallen slower than they actually did.  Finally, there is a further impact of 
rising variety on reducing the import price index. These additional impacts appear to be small in 
the Figures, but we show in the next section that variety has a sizable impact on the overall U.S. 
terms of trade and measures of productivity growth.  
 
5. Terms of Trade and Productivity Growth for the United States  
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 To investigate the sensitivity of estimates of productivity growth to unmeasured gains in 
terms of trade, we calculate alternative versions of the deflators of exports and imports on which 
the estimates of productivity depend. The Major Sector Productivity and Costs Program in BLS’s 
Office of Productivity and Technology uses measures of the output of private business and 
nonfarm private business from BEA.24
generally the 5-digit Enduse level indexes from the International Price Program.  
 Therefore the relevant deflators are the ones calculated by 
BEA using weights from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) and price indexes 
for detailed items from BLS. In the case of exports and imports, the detailed price indexes are  
 We first replicate BLS’s Laspeyres price indexes for 5-digit Enduse exports and imports to 
obtain a baseline for our comparisons. Then, to obtain the building blocks for our corrected 
deflators, we construct parallel export and import price indexes using a Törnqvist index formula, 
and for imports we also calculate additional sets of Törnqvist indexes that include tariffs and 
variety effects, as described in section 4. We then aggregate the various versions of the 5-digit 
Enduse indexes using the Fisher index formula with weights from the NIPAs to obtain deflators 
for merchandise exports and for non-petroleum merchandise imports.  
 Table 3 reports the results for our Törnqvist export price indexes and the three kinds of 
import price indexes: the Törnqvist, the tariff-inclusive Törnqvist, and the tariff-inclusive 
Törnqvist adjusted for variety effects. Unsurprisingly, replacing the Laspeyres index with the 
Törnqvist index has a smaller effect when a Fisher index is used for higher-level aggregation than 
it did when the Laspeyres index was used for all stages of aggregation (as shown in Figure 1). 
Using the Törnqvist formula to calculate the detailed indexes reduces the average growth rate in 
1996-2006 of the aggregate Fisher export index by an average of 0.57 percent per year. The effect 
                                                 
24 BLS previously made a minor adjustment to BEA’s output measure (Fraumeni et al., p. 379), but this is no longer 
necessary.  
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of the use of the Törnqvist formula on the non-petroleum import price index is a bit larger, at 0.77 
percent per year in 1996-2006, or 0.85 percent per year when tariffs are incorporated into the 
import indexes and weights. Finally, correcting the tariff-inclusive Törnqvist formula for growth 
in varieties results in a reduction of 1.47 percent per year in the average growth rate of the imports 
index compared with the baseline Laspeyres index in 1996-2006.  
 Annual terms of trade gains calculated from the Törnqvist export index and the variety-
adjusted Törnqvist import index average almost 2 percent in the 1996-2006, compared to an 
average growth rate of the baseline Laspeyres terms of trade index of only about 1 percent per 
year. The difference between these growth rates, 0.93 percentage points, represents an estimate of 
the average amount of unmeasured gains in terms of trade that the U.S. enjoyed in the years of 
1996-2006 (see the bottom panel of Table 3.)  
 Furthermore, the incremental changes in the estimate of terms of trade gains as we first 
switch from the Laspeyres formula to a Törnqvist formula, then incorporate tariffs in the import 
index, and finally correct for the growth of varieties, provide a decomposition of these unmeasured 
gains in terms of trade into three sources: the substitution bias of the Laspeyres index formula, the 
omission of tariffs from measures of import values and prices, and the unmeasured gains from 
growth of import varieties. Growth in import varieties is the largest source of gains that are missed 
by the conventional Laspeyres measure of terms of trade, accounting for 0.64 percentage points of 
0.93 percent per year difference between the corrected terms of trade index and the Laspeyres 
terms of trade index. This supports the hypothesis that entry of lower priced varieties from new 
sources of supply caused a substantial drop in import prices that was missed by the conventional 
methods used to construct the official indexes.  
 32 
 The difference between the Törnqvist terms of trade with no adjustment for growth in 
import varieties, and the Laspeyres terms of trade grains is 0.21 percent with tariffs omitted from 
import prices, rising to 0.29 percent per year when tariffs are included in the Törnqvist index for 
imports. 25 The conventional Laspeyres terms of trade index under-estimates the gains in the terms 
of trade because the Laspeyres formula over-estimates import price growth more than it does 
export price growth, as was discussed in the previous section.26
 Another way to analyze the sources of the change in the U.S. terms of trade and the 
underestimation of that change by the conventional Laspeyres measure is to look at the 
contributions of individual goods to these changes. IT goods play a substantial role in terms of 
trade gains no matter how these gains are measured. IT goods also contribute disproportionately to 
the difference between the Laspeyres and Törnqvist measures of prices, accounting, on average, 
for almost half of this difference in 1996-2006 in both the export case and the import case. Yet 
because their export side and import side effects largely offset each other, IT goods contribute 
only modestly to the underestimation of gains in terms of trade by the conventional measures. IT 
goods contribute about 0.25 percent per year in 1996-2006 to the Laspeyres measure of terms of 
trade growth and by about 0.35 percent per year to the corrected measure, so the unmeasured 
terms of trade gains attributable to IT goods are, on average, 0.11 percent per year. 
  
 As discussed earlier, an important reason that IT import prices were falling in recent years 
was the U.S. and global tariff cuts under the ITA.  While the direct impact of ITA tariff reductions 
is not captured in BLS Laspeyres import price index, we demonstrated above that the pass-through 
of tariff reductions to import prices in these industries was substantial (see Table 1 and also 
Figures 3, 5, 7, and 9).  In other words, the actual impact of the ITA is captured in the measured 
                                                 
25 It is unusual to incorporate falling tariffs into a calculation of the terms of trade, but natural to do so in our context 
because we have shown in (6) that the tariff-inclusive prices should be used to deflate Rt . 
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Laspeyres import price indexes—and also in the import price indexes in Table 3 that account for 
various measurement problems.  We can therefore calculate a hypothetical non-ITA Laspeyres 
import price index and compare it to the actual Laspeyres import price index reported in Table 3. 
 Table 4 shows this comparison, where we constructed the hypothetical non-ITA index like 
we did in replicating the BLS’s actual index but with the important difference that for the Enduse 
categories covered by the ITA (i.e., categories reported in Table 1) we used not the reported 
import prices but rather our hypothetical non-ITA import prices constructed as reported in Section 
2.  Each column in Table 4 reports that year’s percentage change in actual U.S. import prices (i.e., 
in the actual Laspeyres import price index); that year’s percentage change in hypothetical U.S. 
import prices that would have occurred if the ITA had not happened (i.e., in the non-ITA 
Laspeyres import price index); the difference between these two changes; and the contribution to 
this difference made by the three Enduse categories that were fully covered by the ITA (see Table 
1):  computers, computer accessories, and semiconductors. 
 The key message of Table 4 is that in the absence of the ITA, U.S. import prices every year 
would have fallen less or risen more—by about one percentage point in the initial ITA years when 
many countries were cutting tariffs.  In turn, most of this predicted difference comes from the 
central ITA categories.  Thus, although Table 3 shows that various sources of mis-measurement 
matters for calculated U.S. terms of trade—and thus for calculated productivity growth, as Table 5 
will show—Table 4 quantifies how important the ITA was in lowering actual U.S. import prices.27
 The underestimation of terms of trade gains of 0.93 percent per year in 1996-2006 shown 
in Table 3 can be expected to result in significant overestimation of aggregate output and 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
26 See note 23. 
27 In Table 4 we did not try simulate non-ITA terms of trade because we did not think it reasonable to hold constant 
export prices in the post-ITA years.  Passage of the ITA may have reduced U.S. export prices in response to greater 
competition from now-lower-priced IT imports. 
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productivity growth.  This question we investigate in Table 5.  We first used our Laspeyres export 
and import indexes to calculate baseline price indexes for GDP, for total value added (i.e. the 
revenue function), and for the value added of private business. We then compared the baseline 
indexes for these three higher level aggregates to ones calculated using Törnqvist indexes (with 
tariffs and variety growth included in the imports Törnqvist). The price indexes for value added 
also included tariffs in the import weights, as shown in equation (7). To aggregate the major 
components of the higher level aggregates (domestic final consumption, goods exports, services 
exports, non-petroleum goods imports, services imports and petroleum imports, plus government 
in the case of GDP and total value added) we experimented with both the Törnqvist formula and 
the Fisher formula. As expected, the Törnqvist and Fisher results were virtually identical.  
 The estimates of the growth rate of the price index for GDP are higher with Törnqvist 
export and import indexes than with the baseline indexes by amounts ranging from 0.07 to 0.20 
percent per year in 1996-2006. The average effect is 0.12 percent per year (Table 5, section I). The 
effect on the price index for total value added (for which no official index exists) averages 0.13 
percent per year during that period (Table 5, section II). That is, the corrected deflator for total 
value added grows by 0.13 more per year that the deflator based on the official import and export 
indexes. The slower growth of the corrected import indexes results in more rapid growth of the 
deflator for value added, and slower growth of real value added which translates into slower 
productivity growth of the virtually same magnitude.28
 Because no reliable measure of government sector productivity exists, the most general 
measure of productivity that is available from BLS is for private business. The effect of correcting 
the export and import indexes on the price index for gross value added of private business ranges 
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from 0.10 to 0.27 percent per year, with an average of 0.17 percent per over 1996-2006 (Table 5, 
section III). Again, the slower growth of our Törnqvist import indexes, adjusted for tariffs and 
variety effects, leads to more rapid growth of the deflator for private business value added, and 
therefore a slower real growth of value added.29 The official quantity index for the output of 
private business (rebased to 1994=100) in 2006 is 154.0, compared with our corrected index of 
151.4, with all of the 2.6 percentage point gap coming from the interval of 1996 to 2006 (Table 5, 
section IV). Unmeasured gains in terms of trade therefore add, on average, 0.16 percent per year to 
the official measure of private business productivity growth over the period 1996 through 2006.  
 To gauge the importance of this terms-of-trade mismeasurement, recall that reported 
growth in U.S. nonfarm labor productivity has accelerated from 1.37 percent during 1973-1995 to 
2.69 percent during 1996-2010—i.e., by about 1.3 percent per year. Our results suggest that about 
one-eighth of this reported economy-wide acceleration in labor productivity should properly be 
accounted for as terms-of-trade improvements. Furthermore, current BLS statistics report that U.S. 
nonfarm TFP growth accelerated from 0.53% per year over 1987-1995 to 1.41% per year over 
1996-2006. Our results suggest that about 20% – or one-fifth – of this reported economy-wide 
acceleration in TFP should properly be accounted for by terms-of-trade improvements. The U.S. 
economy in the past decade clearly did enjoy faster productivity growth. But the magnitude of this 
acceleration has been overstated, with a sizable share of the gains actually being accounted for by 
the benefits of international trade. 
 Two caveats concerning the results in Table 5 are worth mentioning. First, we have 
included imported finished investment goods in our corrected import price indexes even though 
                                                                                                                                                                
28 The quantity index for real value added also takes account of the difference between the growth of nominal GDP 
and value added, which depends on the change in total tariff revenue and appears as the first two terms on the right of 
equation (10)). But this difference has only a minimal impact. 
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their deflators have no effect on the measurement of real GDP. These goods are deflated by import 
price indexes in calculating the investment component of GDP, so the effects of any bias in their 
price indexes cancel out when the imports and investment components of GDP are combined. 
Nevertheless, these price indexes do affect the measurement of TFP because estimates of capital 
services inputs are based on accumulated real net investment. Thus, for purposes of estimating 
effects on productivity measurement, we are correct to include imported investment goods in our 
analysis. In any event, these goods account for only a small fraction (probably well under a tenth) 
of the total effect on measured real GDP growth in 1996-1999. 
 Second, we simulated the BLS indexes for semiconductors in all years in Tables 3 and 5, 
but until 1997 BEA used the hedonic indexes of Grimm (1998) rather than indexes from BLS for 
semiconductors. Even though the hedonic indexes fell faster than the matched model indexes of 
BLS, the change to the BLS indexes had little effect on estimates of real GDP because U.S. trade 
in semiconductors was approximately balanced in the late 1990s, and the Grimm indexes and BLS 
indexes both tended to imply similar small gains in terms of trade for this item. Excluding 
semiconductors from our analysis before 1998 would have changed the overall estimate of the 
unmeasured terms of trade gains in the next-to-last row of Table 5 by +0.05 percentage points in 
1995 and by –0.15 percentage points in 1996 and 1997. On average over 1995-2006, the 
contribution of semiconductors to our estimate of unmeasured terms of trade gains is virtually 




                                                                                                                                                                
29 The effect on real value added is not precisely the same in magnitude as the effect on the deflator because the 
calculation of real value added includes an adjustment for nominal tariff revenue.  
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 At first glance, the roles of trade prices and trade barriers in aggregate productivity 
measurement might seem small. But as we have shown in this paper, for many reasons they can be 
very important. Unmeasured gains in the terms of trade cause real output growth and productivity 
growth to be overstated, and declines in tariffs can also be expected to raise productivity. Building 
on the GDP function approach of Diewert and Morrison, in this paper we have developed new 
methods for measuring these effects. We have then applied this framework to the important case 
of the post-1995 U.S. productivity acceleration. 
 Our main result is that approximately 20% of the apparent speed-up in U.S. productivity 
growth as officially reported was actually gains in the terms of trade and tariff reductions—
especially for the IT products that have been the focus of much research on U.S. productivity. In 
generating this result, we analyzed three important sources of mismeasurement in the U.S. terms 
of trade: (i) the import and export prices indexes published by the BLS are Laspeyres indexes, 
rather than a superlative formula; (ii) in the calculation of GDP, imports exclude duties, and the 
BLS import indexes—which the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses to deflate imports—
also measure import prices free of tariffs; and (iii) the BLS import price index does not account for 
increases in the variety of imports coming from new supplying countries. The average growth 
rates of our corrected price indexes for U.S. imports are 1.5% per year lower than growth rate of 
the index calculated using official methods, a key input to reaching our main result. 
 Although our focus in this paper was on the particular case of the post-1995 U.S. 
productivity acceleration, the issues we identified and methods we developed generalize along at 
least four important and related dimensions. 
 First, our analysis could be extended to address other U.S. price series that cover non-
traded parts of the economy and thus help create aggregate productivity statistics. For example, 
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deflators for domestic absorption are beyond the scope of the research in this paper but could be 
examined for possible biases due to expanded product variety. 
 Second, our analysis could be applied to better understand U.S. economic performance in 
earlier periods. From 1948 to 1973, for example, officially measured non-farm U.S. labor 
productivity grew at an annual average of 2.79% – a rapid rate that often leads this period to be a 
“golden generation” in U.S. economic history. But this was also a period of fast growth in U.S. 
trade with rapidly growing countries like Japan, and also of substantial U.S. trade liberalization 
thanks, e.g., to the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These broad 
facts suggest potential value in re-examining this period’s productivity statistics. 
 Third, it would be worthwhile to examine multilateral tariff reductions in other sectors, to 
determine whether we find similar magnified reductions in import prices, as observed in section 2 
under the ITA. In preliminary analysis, we have found a magnified impact of tariff reduction in 
chemicals (which was part of the control group in Section 2 and Table 2). It is noteworthy that that 
sector was indeed subject to a multilateral tariff reduction, under a 1995 Uruguay Round 
agreement called the Chemical Tariff Harmonization Agreement. 
 And fourth, our analysis could be extended to the growth experience of other countries. 
Countries such as China and India appear to have recently delivered productivity gains among the 
fastest the world has ever seen (the recent crisis notwithstanding). At the same time, many of these 
countries have rapidly integrated into the world economy with dramatic declines in trade barriers 
and surging trade flows. As with the post-World War II U.S. generation, so, too, the growth 
experiences of these other countries might look different by our analysis. 
 39 
Appendix: International Price Data 
 To calculate all the price indexes, we use two datasets provided by the International Price 
Program (IPP) program. The first dataset spans September 1993 to December 1996 and was used 
extensively in Alterman, Diewert and Feenstra (1999). That dataset contains long-term price 
relatives (that is, 0i
t
i p/p ) at the “classification group” level, which is similar to the 10-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) level. The classification groups have been carefully concorded to the HS 
system, so that the base-period weights (for 1990) used by the IPP program can be replaced by 
current annual import and export expenditures in order to calculate the Törnqvist indexes. That is, 
current annual weights are used in the Törnqvist index when aggregating from the classification 
group level to the Enduse industries. 
 A second dataset spans January 1997 to December 2006. The classification groups used in 
that dataset differ somewhat from those used in the earlier period, so we have developed an 
(incomplete) concordance between them. The price data available for this latter period are actually 
more detailed than the classification group level, and go down to the “item” level at which 
individual companies provide price quotes. Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) analyze this item-
level data. For this latter period, we first need to aggregate from the item level to the classification 
group level, and then aggregate from the classification groups to Enduse industries. The lower-
level aggregation (from the item level to the classification group) can be done using the base-
period (1995) weights and the Laspeyres formula, which follows the BLS procedure. 
Alternatively, the lower-level aggregation can be done using the base-period weights and a 
geometric formula. After constructing geometric indexes at the lower-level, we proceed by 
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ITA = 1     
Computers (Enduse 21300) 100 1.4 0.0 16.0 
Computer accessories (21301) 100 0.3 0.0 23.7 
Semiconductors (21320) 100 0.0 0.0 2.1 
0.1 < ITA < 1     
Blank tapes (16110) 92 1.5 0.0 n/a 
Telecomm equipment (21400) 79 2.6 0.3 4.6 
Lab Instruments (21600) 63 3.7 2.3 6.0 
Records, tapes & disks (41220) 61 1.0 0.2 n/a 
Electrical apparatus (20005) 48 2.3 1.1 1.5 
Business machines (21500) 39 2.0 0.7 -1.0 
Generators & access (20000) 38 1.6 1.5 -1.4 







Marine engines and parts (22220)a 23 1.6 0.3 n/a 
Wood, glass, plastic (21140) 21 2.2 1.9 7.6 
Photo, service industry (21190) 21 2.1 1.4 19.0 
Metalworking machine tools (21120) 19 3.3 2.9 -4.2 
Materials handling equip (21170) 16 0.4 0.1 n/a 
Industrial supplies, other (16120) 13 2.1 1.7 21.3 
Industrial machines, other (21180) 11 
 
2.2 1.6 12.5 
 
Notes: 
a. Within marine engines and parts (22220), the product receiving ITA tariff cuts was radar equipment. 
Omitted from this table are industries where less than 10% of imports are covered by the ITA. 
b. The price drop due to the ITA is estimated as the cumulative difference (by end-2006) between the 
published BLS import price series and the predicted values of a pass-through regression (described in 
Section 2) holding tariff variables constant at their June 1997 levels for subsequent periods.  
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Table 2:  Pass-Through Regressions 
Dependent Variable – Import Price 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Using nominal tariffs Tariffs multiplied by [1/(1-θ)] 
 Share of products covered by ITA: Share of products covered by ITA: 
 ITA=1 0<ITA<1 ITA=0 ITA=1 0<ITA<1 ITA=0 
ITA1 -0.088** -0.017** -0.012** -0.133** -0.037** -0.009** 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.003) (0.024) (0.006) (0.003) 
ITA2 -0.024 -0.004 -0.004 -0.070** -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.003) (0.025) (0.004) (0.004) 
ITA3 -0.077** -0.034** -0.016** -0.088** -0.034** -0.019** 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) 
U.S. Tariff 13.293** 2.434** 0.994** 1.534** 1.059** 0.721** 
 (1.138) (0.266) (0.095) (0.366) (0.153) (0.053) 
Foreign Tariff 4.146** 0.320** -0.007 0.721** -0.008** 0.020** 
 (0.238) (0.040) (0.017) (0.059) (0.017) (0.006) 
Peg Share 2.888** -0.237 1.829** 1.332 1.185** 2.430** 
 (0.863) (0.421) (0.163) (0.992) (0.300) (0.172) 
Exchange Rate 0.123* 0.033 0.247** -0.248** 0.067** 0.284** 
(6 lags) (0.076) (0.021) (0.011) (0.095) (0.022) (0.012) 
Exchange Rate -0.636** 0.010 -0.389** -0.309 -0.271** -0.506** 
x Peg Share (0.177) (0.088) (0.034) (0.204) (0.093) (0.036) 
Export Price 0.409** 1.136** 0.361** 0.415** 1.097** 0.335** 
 (0.039) (0.020) (0.011) (0.047) (0.016) (0.011) 
       
Observations 459 2,760 3,821 435 2,556 3,871 
R-squared 0.98 0.91 0.72 0.98 0.91 0.77 
 
 
Notes: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%; Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
In columns (1) – (3), the U.S. tariff and a weighted average of foreign tariffs are used. In columns (3) – (6), 
these tariffs are multiplied by [1/(1-θ)], where θ is the share of imported intermediate inputs. 
Regressions are run for 5-digit Enduse industries, with monthly data from September 1993 – December 
2006. Regressions with ITA=1 are run over those industries where 100% of the imports are covered by the 
ITA; regressions with 0 < ITA <1 are run over those industries where 1 – 99% of the import value covered 
by the ITA. The final regressions with ITA=0 are run over a control group of industries (Enduse 12, 2,3,4) 
that do not include any ITA commodities as imports. The regressions are estimated with OLS (including 





Table 3: Effect of Lower-level Index Formula on Aggregate Fisher 
Price Indexes for Exports and Imports 
(Differences in percent per year) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ave. 
96-06 
I. Export Indexes (1994=100)              
Formula for lower-level aggregates              
 Laspeyres 103.1 102.6 101.0 97.5 96.0 97.4 96.5 95.4 96.9 100.2 103.3 106.8  
 Törnqvist 102.4 101.8 99.7 95.6 93.6 94.1 92.8 91.1 92.2 94.7 97.1 99.6  
Growth rate difference of Törnqvist from Laspeyres  -0.74 -0.13 -0.43 -0.65 -0.52 -0.92 -0.58 -0.55 -0.46 -0.65 -0.59 -0.82 -0.57 
 Contribution of IT goods to above difference -0.09 -0.18 -0.24 -0.4 -0.28 -0.63 -0.39 -0.18 -0.1 -0.21 -0.15 -0.24 -0.27 
II. Import Indexes (1994=100)              
Formula for lower-level aggregates              
 Laspeyres 102.6 100.7 97.7 94.0 92.1 92.3 90.6 88.6 89.4 91.6 93.6 94.9  
 Törnqvist 102.1 99.7 95.8 90.9 88.2 87.6 85.5 83.4 83.4 84.8 86.1 86.7  
 Törnqvist, tariffs included in prices 101.8 99.3 95.3 90.3 87.5 86.9 84.8 82.5 82.5 83.9 85.1 85.7  
 Törnqvist, adjusted for tariffs and varieties 101.7 98.7 94.1 88.4 85.4 84.5 81.8 79.2 79 79.6 80.5 79.8  
Growth rate difference from Laspeyres               
 Törnqvist -0.51 -0.47 -0.93 -1.31 -0.99 -0.91 -0.57 -0.23 -0.93 -0.74 -0.7 -0.7 -0.77 
 Törnqvist, tariffs included in prices -0.80 -0.66 -0.98 -1.41 -1.13 -1.00 -0.55 -0.41 -0.96 -0.81 -0.71 -0.69 -0.85 
 Törnqvist, adjusted for tariffs and varieties -0.94 -1.07 -1.65 -2.23 -1.37 -2.08 0.09 -1.59 -1.19 -1.71 -1.03 -2.18 -1.47 
 Contribution of IT goods to above difference -0.04 -0.34 -0.71 -0.76 -0.63 -0.49 -0.39 -0.10 -0.22 -0.22 -0.18 -0.17 -0.38 
III. Terms of Trade (1994=100)              
Formula for lower-level aggregates              
 Laspeyres 100.4 101.9 103.4 103.8 104.2 105.5 106.5 107.7 108.4 109.4 110.4 112.6  
 Törnqvist 100.2 102.0 104.0 105.2 106.1 107.4 108.5 109.3 110.6 111.7 112.8 114.9  
 Törnqvist, tariffs included in prices 100.5 102.5 104.6 105.8 107.0 108.4 109.4 110.4 111.8 113.0 114.1 116.2  
 Törnqvist adjusted for tariffs and varieties 100.6 103.1 105.9 108.1 109.6 111.4 113.4 115.1 116.8 119.1 120.7 124.8  
Difference from Laspeyres in annual growth rate              
 Törnqvist -0.23 0.35 0.53 0.7 0.48 0.00 0.00 -0.32 0.48 0.09 0.12 -0.10 0.21 
 Törnqvist, tariffs included in prices 0.06 0.55 0.59 0.81 0.63 0.10 -0.02 -0.14 0.51 0.16 0.13 -0.12 0.29 
 Törnqvist adjusted for tariffs and varieties 0.20 0.99 1.30 1.70 0.89 0.49 0.79 0.46 0.73 1.07 0.45 1.41 0.93 
 Contribution of IT goods to above difference -0.11 0.16 0.46 0.35 0.35 -0.15 0.00 -0.09 0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.11 
Notes: 
All indexes are normalized to 100 in 1994. Lower-level aggregates are at the Enduse 5-digit (or in some cases 3-digit) level. These indexes are 
then aggregated using the Fisher Ideal formula to obtain the higher-level aggregates, shown here. 
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Table 4: Comparing Changes in Actual U.S. Import Prices 
and Changes in Hypothetical U.S. Import Prices That Would Have Occurred without the ITA 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Laspeyres Using Actual Import Prices -3.84 -2.02 0.30 -1.86 -2.24 0.93 2.47 2.17 1.35 
Hypothetical Laspeyres without ITA -2.54 -1.12 0.79 -1.13 -1.66 1.19 2.58 2.51 1.63 
Difference 1.30 0.90 0.48 0.74 0.58 0.26 0.12 0.34 0.27 
Contribution of IT Goods to Difference 1.02 0.85 0.43 0.69 0.44 0.36 0.20 0.25 0.13 
 
Notes: 
Each column in Table 4 reports that year’s percentage change in actual U.S. import prices (i.e., in the actual Laspeyres import price index, 
levels of which are reported in Table 3); that year’s percentage change in hypothetical U.S. import prices that would have occurred if the ITA 
had not happened (i.e., in the non-ITA Laspeyres import price index); the difference between these two changes; and the contribution to this 
difference made by the three Enduse categories that were fully covered by the ITA (see Table 1):  computers, computer accessories, and 
semiconductors.  See Table 2 and related text discussion for calculation of hypothetical non-ITA import prices for Enduse categories covered 
under the ITA. 
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Table 5: Fisher Price Indexes for GDP, Total Value Added, 
and Value Added of Private Business adjusted for Effects 
of lower-Level Törnqvist Indexes, Tariffs and Variety 
(Differences in percent per year) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ave. 
96-06 
I. Price index for GDP              
 baseline (official, rebased to 1994=100) 102.1 104 105.9 107.1 108.6 111.0 113.5 115.3 117.8 121.2 125.2 129.3  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula 102.1 104.1 106.0 107.2 108.9 111.3 113.8 115.6 118.2 121.6 125.7 129.8  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula & tariffs /a/  102.1 104.1 106.0 107.3 109 111.4 113.9 115.8 118.3 121.7 125.9 130.0  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula, tariffs & variety 102.1 104.2 106.1 107.5 109.2 111.7 114.3 116.2 118.9 122.4 126.6 131.0  
 Growth rate difference from baseline for above index 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.12 
II. Price index for Total Value Added              
 Adjusted for Törnqvist formula  102.1 104.1 106.0 107.3 109.0 111.4 113.9 115.7 118.3 121.7 125.8 130.0  
 Adjusted for Törnqvist formula & tariffs  102.1 104.1 106.1 107.4 109 111.5 114.0 115.9 118.4 121.9 126.0 130.1  
 Adjusted for Törnqvist formula, tariffs & variety 102.1 104.2 106.2 107.6 109.3 111.8 114.4 116.4 119.0 122.5 126.7 131.1  
 Growth rate difference from baseline for above index 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.13 
III. Price Index for Private Business Value Added              
 baseline (official, rebased to 1994=100) 101.8 103.4 105 105.8 106.6 108.6 110.5 111.3 112.9 115.8 119.6 123.1  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula 101.8 103.5 105.2 106.1 107.0 109.0 111.0 111.8 113.5 116.5 120.4 124.0  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula & tariffs /a/  101.8 103.5 105.3 106.1 107.1 109.1 111.1 112 113.7 116.7 120.6 124.1  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula, tariffs& variety 101.8 103.6 105.5 106.4 107.4 109.5 111.6 112.6 114.4 117.5 121.5 125.4  
 Growth rate difference from baseline for above index 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.27 0.17 
IV. Quantity Index for Private Business Value Added               
 baseline (official, rebased to 1994=100) 102.8 107.5 113.1 118.7 125.3 131 132 134.6 138.8 144.6 149.4 154.0  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula 102.8 107.5 112.9 118.5 125.0 130.6 131.6 134.2 138.2 143.9 148.7 153.1  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula & tariffs /a/  102.8 107.4 112.9 118.4 124.9 130.4 131.4 134.0 138.0 143.7 148.4 152.9  
 adjusted for Törnqvist formula, tariffs& variety 102.8 107.3 112.7 118.0 124.5 129.9 130.8 133.3 137.2 142.7 147.3 151.4  























Figure 2: Alternative Terms of Trade Indexes














Figure 3: Import Prices, Computers (21300)






























Figure 5: Import Prices, Computer Accessories (21301)






























Figure 7: Import Prices, Semiconductors (21320)



























Figure 9: Import Prices, Telecommunications (21400)












Figure 10: Export Prices, Telecommunications (21400)
BLS Laspeyres Tornqvist
 
